Critical reflections on the registration duty on court decisions

A party that loses its case in court and is ordered to pay a sum of money must pay a 3% tax on that sum: the ‘judgment duty’ (veroordelingsrecht).[1] More than ninety years after its introduction, this registration duty on court decisions continues to raise questions.

In this contribution we take a closer look at two problem areas. The first concerns the levying of the duty: it remains unclear whether the judgment duty can and may be applied to judgments in the company-law dispute settlement procedure (geschillenregeling). The second concerns, more generally, its collection: in the event of enforcement, the tax authorities still take priority over the beneficiary of the judgment for the amount of the registration duty, seemingly contrary to the legislature’s intention.

  1. Application of the registration duty to judgments in the dispute settlement procedure

The registration duty on court decisions is governed by Articles 142 et seq. of the Belgian Code of Registration Duties (W.Reg.). The following conditions must be met (cumulatively) for the judgment duty to apply:

  1. there is a decision made by the court on its own authority in the operative part of a judgment or an exequatur;
  2. rendered by a court or tribunal;
  3. in a contentious matter;
  4. resulting in an order to pay, a liquidation or a ranking of creditors;
  5. with sums of money or movable assets as its subject matter.

As regards the company-law dispute settlement procedure, the difficulty lies primarily in the fourth (and fifth) condition. In our view, no judgment duty is due, for several reasons.

First of all, the principal claim in the dispute settlement procedure is the transfer or takeover of the shares. The price is merely a consequence of this, even if the court expressly mentions the payment or determines the final price at a later stage.

In addition, according to the ratio legis of Article 142 W.Reg., the judgment duty must be borne by the losing party. Where the claim is one for the exclusion of a shareholder, however, it is the successful party that has to pay the price (and will be ‘ordered’ to do so). It cannot possibly have been the legislature’s intention that this party should then also have to pay the registration duty. Sometimes there is not even a losing party, for instance where reciprocal claims for exclusion and withdrawal are granted on account of lasting disagreement without any wrongful conduct.

Moreover, the judgment ordering the transfer of ownership in the dispute settlement procedure is constitutive: through the imposed transfer or takeover of shares, it creates a new legal relationship and is aimed at resolving a shareholder conflict, often in the company’s interest. Unlike a classic, declaratory order to pay a sum of money, this argues, in our view, against applying the judgment duty.

Furthermore, the order must relate to a ‘disputed’ right. It does happen (albeit rather exceptionally) that there is no discussion about the price of the shares. Where, for example, two shareholders each claim the other’s exclusion and value the (proportional) share price in the same way, there is no dispute about that price.

In any event, the registration duty on the judgment is a cost which, pursuant to Article 1017 of the Belgian Judicial Code (Ger.W.), must be borne by the unsuccessful party.[2] In the dispute settlement procedure, however, the costs are often apportioned, for example in the event of lasting disagreement between the shareholders, or because both parties are partly unsuccessful, for instance as a result of a dispute about the price. It makes little sense then to order both parties also to pay part of the judgment duty on the price to be paid.

Nevertheless, in practice the tax authorities sometimes levy the judgment duty on amounts due as a result of a withdrawal or exclusion. In their view, there is a disputed right that can be quantified as a specific sum where the takeover price was disputed. The tax authorities take this view even where there was no dispute whatsoever about the amount of the price to be paid (which is not uncommon in the case of a provisional price). In that case a ‘disputed right’ is lacking in any event, irrespective of the fundamental question whether the judgment duty can be due at all on the price in the context of the dispute settlement procedure.

  • The (abolished?) privilege of the tax authorities

The Code of Registration Duties provides that the tax authorities have a privilege over the sums which the unsuccessful party has been ordered to pay. Following a number of legislative amendments, however, it is unclear whether and to what extent the tax authorities can still rely on that privilege.

Until 1986, the judgment duty was paid by the beneficiary of the judgment, who could subsequently recover it from the unsuccessful party and therefore bore the risk of that party proving insolvent.[3] In 1986, the legislature reversed the roles: from then on, the unsuccessful party had to pay the registration duties. So as not to place the insolvency risk entirely on the tax authorities, they were granted a privilege over the sums and assets that are the subject of an order to pay, a liquidation or a ranking of creditors (Art. 150 W.Reg.). That privilege was coupled with a prohibition on notaries, bailiffs, liquidators, insolvency practitioners and officials of the Deposit and Consignment Office paying out the sums concerned as long as the registration duties had not been paid (Art. 184bis W.Reg.). Between 1990 and 2014, the beneficiary could once again be held liable as well, up to half of the amount of registration duties due. In 2014, the legislature abolished that possibility again, because it considered the joint and several liability of the party ordered to pay and the beneficiary (up to half) to be a ‘situation perceived as unjust’.[4]

Articles 150 and 184bis W.Reg. remained unchanged, however, so that the tax authorities (according to the letter of the law) still take priorityover the beneficiary. In concrete terms, this means that the tax authorities take priority in the distribution of the proceeds of an attachment, up to the amount of the registration duty. If the proceeds of the attachment are insufficient, this may mean that the beneficiary of the judgment does not receive the full amount to which he is entitled under the judgment. In the worst case, nothing at all is left for the beneficiary.

In a 2014 circular, the tax authorities themselves initially acknowledged that the legislature had forgotten to amend Articles 150 and 184bis W.Reg.[5] In 2020, the tax authorities deleted the words ‘through an oversight’ and have since (rather opportunistically) themselves referred to the 1986 regime in order to legitimise their privilege. That does not alter the fact, however, that in 2014 the legislature clearly expressed its intention to shield the beneficiary entirely from payment of the judgment duty.[6]

As long as Articles 150 and 184bis W.Reg. remain unchanged, however, the beneficiary of the judgment nonetheless remains indirectly involved in the collection of the registration duties.

  • Conclusion

In our view, there are no grounds for applying the judgment duty to the order to pay the price that is pronounced in the context of the company-law dispute settlement procedure.

Moreover, the current situation, in which the tax authorities, in the context of enforcement, de facto take priority over the beneficiary of the judgment, runs directly counter to the intentions of the legislature.

The legislature would do well to repeal Articles 150 and 184bis W.Reg., which would remove all uncertainty surrounding the privilege of the tax authorities and the prohibition on payment imposed on public officials. In addition, we also advocate a provision clarifying that no judgment duty can be levied on the takeover price which a party is ordered to pay in the context of the company-law dispute settlement procedure. But even without such a provision, it is in our view the case de lege lata that the judgment duty cannot be applied to the price that a party must pay in the context of the company-law dispute settlement procedure.

Robbie Tas and Ellen Gijsen

intui attorneys

***

This blog article is based on our contribution to the Liber Amicorum Philippe Lambrecht, which was published in October 2026. For a more detailed discussion, we refer to that contribution.


[1] Since 1989, a minimum threshold of EUR 12,500 has applied. A party ordered to pay less than EUR 12,500 does not have to pay any registration duty.

[2] See Arts. 1018-1019 Ger.W.; CALLEWAERT S., ‘W.Reg. art. 150’ in X.,Voorrechten en hypotheken. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Wolters Kluwer, 2020, (33) 35, no. 4.

[3] CALLEWAERT S., ‘W.Reg. art. 150’ in X., Voorrechten en hypotheken. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Wolters Kluwer, 2020, (33) 35, no. 4.

[4] Bill containing various tax provisions (Wetsontwerp houdende diverse fiscale bepalingen), Parl.St. Chamber 2013-2014, 53-3236/1, 3.

[5] Circular no. 9/2014, 23 April 2014.

[6] CALLEWAERT S., ‘W.Reg. art. 150’ in X.,Voorrechten en hypotheken. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Wolters Kluwer, 2020, (33) 35, no. 20.